A murder has been committed. You are in charge of the investigation, and you suspect Jules. Let 0 be the proposition that you dust the murder weapon for fingerprints, let Cl be the proposition that you dust the weapon for fingerprints and find Jules'prints, let C 2 be the proposition that you dust the weapon for fingerprints without finding Jules'prints, and let P be the proposition that Jules is the murderer. Now it is dear that, by dusting the weapon for fingerprints, you will change your subjective probability that Jules is the killer. If you discover Jules' prints on the weapon, your new probability that Jules is the killer, Pr(PIC 1 ) will be dose but not equal to one. (Jules might have innocently held the weapon on a different occasion.) If your examination of the weapon does not find Jules' prints, your new probability that Jules is the killer, Pr(PIC 2 ), will be dose but not equal to zero. (Jules might have worn gloves during the crime.) But, while the result of your observation can dearly alter your subjective likelihood that Jules is the killer, we would like to propose that the mere fact of making the observation should not affect your degree of belief that J ules is the malefactor. Instead, your current subjective probability that Jules is the killer ought to be a weighted average of the very high probability that J ules is the killer that you will have if you examine the weapon and find his fingerprints versus the very low probability of Jules' guilt that you will have if you examine the weapon without finding his prints. The weights for the averaging are given, respectively, by your current probability that, if you examine the weapon, you will find his prints versus your current probability that, if you ex amine the weapon, you will not find his prints. That is, your current subjective probability of P should equal your current estimate of what the probability of P will become after you have performed the observation o. Wehave
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We caU this a "good" observation principle because it's a principle governing observations which in no way influence the things being observed. For example, a policeman who wanders fully uniformed through a crowd observing how many people are geuing their wallets lifted is doing a good job of protecting the citizenry from theft but a bad job of observing the incidence ofpickpocketry, since the policeman's presence discourages pickpockets, so that Pr(your pocket is picked I the policeman observes whether your pocket is picked) is much less than Pr(your pocket is picked).
For another example, suppose that, if you find Jules' fingerprints on the murder weapon, he is likely to be arrested, whereas, if you choose not to ex amine the weapon, it is unlikely that there will be
